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 The (Adverse) E⁄ects of Expanding Higher




Over the period 1995-1998 Italy experienced an expansion of its higher education
supply with the aim of reducing regional di⁄erences in educational attainment. This
paper evaluates the e⁄ects of this policy on enrolment, drop out and academic perfor-
mance. The paper combines di⁄erences across provinces in the number of campuses
constructed with di⁄erences across cohorts of secondary school leavers. A sequen-
tial model of educational choices with uncertainty is derived and estimated. Findings
suggest that enrolment rose, particularly among middle ability individuals from less
favorable backgrounds, as well as the probability of being retained in the university
system. The decline in passed exams, especially experienced in Southern regions, casts
doubts on the policy e⁄ectiveness in reducing regional disparities.
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11 Introduction
Higher education is an important political and social issue in developed countries. The past
decades have seen sheer expansion of the demand of higher education, which lead to the
establishment of new institutions in many developed countries. The process of expansion
took place either by setting up new universities, new types of institutions (poly-techniques) or
by increasing the role of the private sector. Although a number of researchers have analyzed
the determinants of the demand for higher education, little attention has been placed on the
role of supply factors on educational choices.
Research on the e⁄ects of supply is problematic because universities, besides being often
di⁄erentiated along the quality dimension, are not randomly allocated across regions. The
ideal experiment would be to allocate universities randomly to some regions and not to
others in a homogenous centralized higher educational system and then compare educational
choices across regions. This paper exploits the sharp increase in the supply of universities
over a period of just few years at the end of the 1990￿ s in Italy to evaluate the impact
of the expansion on educational choices. From the beginning of the 1990￿ s, the political
government implemented a supply side policy that resulted in a widespread increase in
local institutions, uniformly scattered across the country, and in an expansion of existing
universities, which increased the range of degrees o⁄ered. This paper evaluates the e⁄ects
of the expansion that took place over the period 1995-1998, after which some provinces
increased their campuses while others maintained the same universities￿provision, by means
of a di⁄erence in di⁄erences estimation strategy.
The outcomes of interest are enrolment, drop out and academic performance. These
outcomes are informative on higher education performance and indirectly on graduates labor
market outcomes. Labor markets reward youngsters with higher education by entitling them
to higher employment opportunities and a wage premium. In fact, graduates stand a stronger
chance of getting a job: 86 percent of graduates in the age bracket 25-64 are employed against
77 percent among those with upper secondary education. They also earn 27 percent more.1
The enrolment rate in higher education in Italy at the end of the Nineties was 46 percent,
whilst the same statistic for the US was 74 percent.2 Moreover, enrolment in Italy does not
always lead to successful graduation: in 2000, only 42 percent of the students who enrolled
actually earned a degree. The same statistic for US was 66 percent.3 Among those, the
majority complete their degree well beyond the expected time. This means that a large
fraction of young people is still in education, whereas it should be in the labor market. In
2000, the fraction of students in the age bracket 25-29 still in university and not employed
was 13,5 percent in Italy and 2,9 in US.4
The policy o⁄ers a unique quasi experimental research design. The Italian higher educa-
tional system has traditionally been organized at the national level, which guarantees that
titles of higher education attainment are legally valid throughout Italy, independently of the
1Source: OECD, Education at a glance, 2002.
2Source: EUROSTAT, 1998. The fraction measures the number of students with ISCED 5-6 quali￿cation
as a percentage of 20-24 years old in the population.
3Source: OECD, Education at a glance, 2002. Drop out is computed as the complement of the ratio
between the number of graduates and the number of new entrants in the typical year of entrance.
4Source: OECD, Education at a glance, 2002.
2institution that issues them. Universities are indeed perceived as substitutes and individuals
enroll in the one nearest to their place of residence.5 Moreover, the Italian political situation
at the beginning of the process of expansion o⁄ers an ideal setting for evaluating the impact
of the program that limits the possible concerns about endogeneity of the policy one might
have. The lack of institutional arrangements allowed the dominant party system to imple-
ment public policies without de￿ning clear instructions and objectives. In fact, the increase
in higher education supply was hardly driven by an economic rationale and the allocation
rule was not clearly spelled out. Rather, the expansion followed an indiscriminate allocation
of public funds across Italian regions.
The policy was explicitly justi￿ed by the need to balance higher education supply across
the national territory with the aim of reducing disparities in educational attainment between
the North and South of the country. The range of enrolment and drop out rate were especially
wide across regions: for instance, in 1994 the enrolment rate in the North was as high as
67 percent, whilst in Southern regions it was nearly 10 percentage points lower; drop out
rates showed similar di⁄erences: close to 65 percent in Northern regions, and to 76 percent
in Southern ones.6
Evaluating the e⁄ects of this program is helpful for three reasons. First, it allows measur-
ing how supply factors shape the demand for higher education. Second, it assesses whether
instituting a new campus in a less economically advanced area has an e⁄ect on closing the
gap in educational attainment with more developed ones. Third, it has external validity
since reforms of this type were carried out in many other European countries that share
similar centrally organized higher educational system.
To better understand the channel through which the expansion a⁄ects schooling decisions,
a sequential model of educational choices is developed, with uncertainty over individual abil-
ity. The main e⁄ect of having access to nearby higher education is to reduce the investment
cost of entering university. The investment is expected to become more appealing for more
disadvantaged groups in the society and educational opportunities more equalized across
di⁄erent social backgrounds. However, local universities might exert a negative impact on
aggregate academic performance because of the enrolment of marginally less able individuals.
Results show that the higher education supply expansion increases university enrolment,
especially among individuals with middle schooling ability and less favorable family back-
grounds, without increasing their probability to quit university. However, academic perfor-
mance worsens, especially in Southern regions, where only new scienti￿c faculties are set
up. Therefore, the policy spurs prolonged duration in university in the least developed area
of the country, without achieving its objective of reducing gaps in educational attainment
between the North and South of the country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II brie￿ y reviews the economic
literature on the supply expansion of education. Section III displays the conceptual frame-
work using a sequential model of schooling choices. Section IV describes the implementation
of the Italian policy and presents the identi￿cation strategy. Section V is devoted to the
estimation of the e⁄ects of the policy on a set of outcome indicators. Section VI performs
5Only 15 percent of students enroll in a university placed in a region di⁄erent from the one of residence
(Source: ISTAT).
6Source: ISTAT (1994) "Investigation on Higher Education".
3some robustness checks and section VII concludes the paper.
2 Literature
Economic research on the e⁄ects of political changes, such as the expansion of education
supply, is modest and quite recent. Du￿ o (2001) evaluates the e⁄ects of a major primary
school construction program launched in Indonesia between 1973 and 1978 using a di⁄erence
in di⁄erences methodology. She exploits the fact that the exposure to school construction
varied exogenously by date and place of birth to estimate the impact of the expansion on
years of education. Results point towards a signi￿cant increase in the proportion of the
population with more years of primary education.
Using a similar estimation strategy, Berlinski and Galiani (2007) assess the impact of
a large construction of pre-primary school facilities program in Argentina on pre-primary
school enrolment and maternal labor supply. Their identi￿cation strategy relies as well on
the heterogeneous intensity of program exposure across provinces and cohorts induced by
the timing of the policy. They ￿nd that the construction program has a sizeable impact on
pre-primary school enrolment among children aged 3-5 and increases maternal employment.
Few papers evaluate the e⁄ects of a tertiary education expansion program. Holzer (2006)
investigates the impacts of the expansion of higher education supply in Sweden, where at the
end of the 1970￿ s new regional university colleges were established. The author provides some
support that the expansion increases equality of opportunities in entering higher education.
For Italy, Bratti et al. (2008) study the e⁄ects of the expansion of universities and
faculties provision in Italy over the decade 1990-2000. Using data from the Bank of Italy
Survey of Households Income and Wealth, they focus on the likelihood of holding a university
degree and of being a university student. Exposure to the program depends on cohort of
birth and actual region of residence, with the assumption that current region of residence
coincides with the region of residence at age 19. Results show robust evidence of a positive
e⁄ect of higher education expansion on student￿ s enrolment and retention, but no signi￿cant
impact on the probability of graduation. Di Pietro and Catullo (2008) evaluate the e⁄ects of
the 2001 Italian University reform, which introduced greater ￿ exibility in the degree program
structure, on drop out behavior. Using the Oaxaca decomposition method on repeated cross
sectional data, the authors ￿nd that the reform is associated with a decline in the predicted
probability of dropping out.
The novelties of this paper are three. The ￿rst is methodological. The quasi experimental
design tries to answer the counterfactual question: what would have happened to students￿
behavior if they had not been subject to the policy? With respect to Bratti et al. (2008),
the paper improves the identi￿cation strategy by using another database with information
on the province of residence at the age of 19 and the year of enrolment into university.7
With respect to Di Pietro and Catullo (2008), it identi￿es the coe¢ cients of interest net
of possible unobservable trend e⁄ects. The second and the third novelties are substantive.
The paper, enriched by the intuition from the model, provides explanations for the policy
partially ine⁄ectiveness found by Bratti et al. (2008) by measuring the e⁄ect of the change
in the composition of enrolled students and the impact of the type of faculties instituted.
7Provinces are administrative sub-division of a region, which is the ￿rst order administrative subdivision
of the Italian state. Italian provinces consist of several administrative municipalities.
4Finally, it provides a wider evaluation of the program as it assesses also the e⁄ect of the
policy in reducing across regional disparities.
From a policy perspective, the ￿ndings are relevant for European countries that feature
a higher educational system with a low degree of di⁄erentiation along the quality dimension.
3 A sequential model of schooling choices
In this section a simple sequential model describes the youngster￿ s decision of entering uni-
versity, dropping out and the optimal human capital investment choice using a human capital
model with uncertainty over individual ability.8
Consider a risk neutral individual with uncertainty over his individual ability. The infor-
mation set is described as follows. Let ￿i be a measure of the unknown individual ability.
Students have prior beliefs over ￿i; speci￿cally, assume that this prior is normally distributed
with mean ￿￿ and precision, which is the inverse of the variance, ￿￿. Beliefs about ￿i change
as a function of an observed signal. The individual observes two signals, one before deciding
whether to enter university or not and one after university enrolment. The ￿rst signal could
be observable parental education or the mark from high school. The second might indicate
the result of exams taken, either in terms of success or failure or of the grade scored. More
formally, following Jovanovic (1979), the signal of individual i at time ￿, takes the following
expression:
si￿ = ￿i + ￿i￿ (1)
where ￿i￿ is noise at time ￿, independent of ￿i and normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision ￿￿:To add realism to the model, ￿￿ could vary over time or across provinces. In the
former case, the ￿rst and the second signal would capture di⁄erent information acquired; in
the latter, skills may be distributed in a non-homogeneous way across the territory or the
quality of revealed information may not be geographically uniformly distributed. Here, as I
am unable to separately identify these di⁄erent sources of information with available data,
I consider a baseline model with constant precision. Since both ￿i and ￿i￿ are normally
distributed and independent, the conditional mean of ￿i given si￿, that is, the posterior
about ￿i, is a linear function of the observed signal. After the ￿rst signal has been received,
















(si0 + si1) (3)
The conditional value of ￿ follows a randomwalk with incremental variance that declines
deterministically to zero as ￿ ! 1: Learning through experimentation reduces the degree
of uncertainty on the value of ability.
8The reduced form model is preferred to a structural model as the quasi randomness of the experiment
allows for identi￿cation of the parameters of interest without relying on the assumption of a structural model.
5The timing of the model is the following. At time ￿ = 0 the individual chooses whether
to enroll in university or enter the labor market according to the ￿rst prior about his ability.9
At time ￿ = 1 the student receives a further signal correlated with his true ability, updates
his beliefs and chooses whether to continue university or to drop out. Finally, at time ￿ = 2,
if enrolled, he decides the optimal amount of human capital to attain.10
The expected utility function of individual i, born in province j, in cohort t, at time ￿
takes the following form:
U(Z;x)ijt￿ = B(x)ijt￿ ￿ C(Z;x)ijt￿ (4)
where B(x) is the income earned by an individual with higher education x and C(Z;x) is the
expected cost of the human capital investment. I assume that returns to graduation for an
individual i born in province j are linear and discounted by a factor ￿
2￿￿; with 1






Returns to higher education are a⁄ected by local economic conditions ￿j and the premium
￿ to the stock of human capital xi. The ability ￿i is an input of the educational production
process, whilst xi is the result of the educational process on innate ability: the stock of
competencies and knowledge acquired during university attendance (see Ben-Porath, 1967).
Individuals in the data are interviewed three years after secondary school completion
and wages earned after university graduation are not observed. Thus, with the available
information, the e⁄ect of the policy can be estimated only in the short term.11 The expected
cost of education C(Z;x) is a function of two monetary components of schooling and a
non-monetary one. In particular:





The ￿rst component is modeled as a linear function of the number of universities (Zjt) in
province j for cohort t and captures the most important modi￿cation induced by the program.
The institution of a university in the province of residence reduces travelling distances,
9Arcidiacono (2004) and Arcidiacono et al. (2009) show that, besides selection into college, self-selection
into degree, driven by expected wages and unobservable ability, is an important aspect of the educational
process. Their results are derived under the assumption that all degrees are always available at all colleges. In
contrast, in this paper, new universities might o⁄er only a subset of degrees. The monetary cost of attending
a particular degree depends on its availability nearby or faraway. Under the standard assumption that
individuals choose the degree that maximizes the di⁄erence between bene￿ts and costs, individuals at the
margin between attending a degree available nearby or another one faraway are a⁄ected by the institution
of new degrees nearby. In this setting, the choice of degree can be formally disregarded without loss of
generality.
10In reality students do not decide sequentially whether to drop out and then the optimal human capital
investment; rather, the two decisions may occur simultaneously. This simpli￿ed assumption makes easier
the analytical solution of the model, but will be relaxed in the empirical implementation.
11As noticed by Heckman, Lockner and Taber (1998) and Angrist (1995), policies that reduce the monetary
cost of education might, as an indirect e⁄ect in the long run, change the equilibrium in the market of skills.
Moreover, as Brunello and Cappellari (2008) show, college attended matters for employment and early
earnings in Italy. The expansion may as well a⁄ect the skill price of graduates from new universities versus
that of graduates from old ones.
6thereby lowering the investment cost. The coe¢ cient ￿￿ is allowed to vary according to the
time at which the decision is taken and is expected to have a negative sign. The second
term indicates the non-monetary cost of human capital acquisition that is lower the higher
the expected conditional ability E(￿ijsi￿). The hypothesis of convex cost, usual in this
literature, ensures that a given amount of investment is less costly when spread out over
multiple periods than when it is concentrated in a single period. Finally, I de￿ne the utility
derived from entering the labor market as a linear function of ￿j, which summarizes labor
market conditions for unskilled labor and represents the outside option of education. It is
taken to be constant over time. The assumption might not be fully realistic if labor market
outcomes are characterized by some degree of uncertainty, which would call for time varying
local labor market conditions, but is coherent with information available. The model is
solved backward, starting with the optimal choice of exams in the last period.
Working backward, I look for the optimal number of exams at ￿ = 2 for an individual
who has decided to continue higher education in the previous period:
Max





The optimal number of exams is:
x
￿
ijt2 = p0 + p1(si0 + si1) (8)
where p0 = ￿ ￿￿
￿￿+2￿￿￿￿ is a constant term representing the average number of exams taken by
the population of enrolled students, and p1 = ￿
￿￿
￿￿+2￿￿ weights the individual deviation from
the national average. The optimal amount of exams is increasing in individual conditional
ability and in the labor market premium to skills.
To characterize the optimal stopping criterion at time 1, after information on individual
ability has been updated, the optimal number of exams x￿ is substituted in the utility
function and E(￿ijsi￿) replaced with equation (3):
U(Z)ijt1 = ￿￿j ￿ ￿1Zjt + ￿0 + ￿1 (si0 + si1) (9)
where ￿0 = (￿ ￿ 1
2)￿2 ￿￿
￿￿+2￿￿￿￿ is a constant term that incorporates the premium for skills
and the characteristics of the ability distribution at time 1 and ￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1
2)￿2 ￿￿
￿￿+2￿￿ is the
coe¢ cient of the sum of the two signals.12 At time ￿ = 1, the student chooses the maximum
between university continuation and the outside option in the labor market. Students are





ijt1 = ￿j(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿1Zjt ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿1 (si0 + si1) (10)
Only actual drop out is observed, so the outcome of interest is a dummy variable dijt =
I(d￿
ijt > 0) equal to one when individual i quits university. Consistently with economic
theory, the propensity to abandon university increases the higher is the opportunity cost ￿j,
12The result relies on the assumption that 1
2 < ￿ < 1. The assumption is realistic as students are expected
to be impatient about short term outcomes like the wage earned at the end of their academic career.
7whilst it decreases the higher is the premium for graduation ￿ and the lower the monetary
cost of attending university (high Zjt).
I now turn to de￿ne the optimal entry choice at time 0: The expected utility at ￿ = 0;















￿￿+￿￿￿￿ is the modi￿ed constant term that embeds information known




￿￿+￿￿ the coe¢ cient of si0 and E0(dijt1) the expected probability of
drop out next period. At time ￿ = 0, the student chooses the maximum between the expected
value of university entry and the outside option in the labor market, [E0(U(Z)ijt1);￿j]. By
imposing indi⁄erence between the two terms in squared brackets, exploiting the fact that ￿j
is constant over time and neglecting discounting over one period (￿ t 1), the propensity to
enter university e￿
ijt0 reads as follows:
e
￿





The outcome of interest eijt = I(e￿
ijt > 0) equals one when e￿
ijt0 > 0 and zero otherwise. The
fraction of students that enroll at university is increasing in the number of campuses.
Following Du￿ o (2001), individuals￿outcomes for the two cohorts of youngsters are ag-
gregated and di⁄erence over time computed. Consider an old cohort denoted by 0 and a
younger cohort denoted by 1. Average educational outcomes are computed by substituting
si0 and (si0 + si1) with their expected value. However, as drop out is observed only if the
student enrolls university and performance if he does not quit it, the aggregate values of
these outcomes have to account for self-selection. The analytical expressions are easy to
compute due to the normality assumption.13 The di⁄erences between cohort 0 and 1 in the










































































is the critical point above which realizations of si0 lead to enter university. Similarly, the equa-
tion for the number of exams reads x￿































is the threshold below which realizations of (si0 + si1) imply drop
out.
8The model predicts that the policy a⁄ects enrolment and drop out directly, and indi-
rectly in￿ uences drop out and the human capital investment, due to changes in the ability
composition of the enrolled students. More speci￿cally, an increase in the number of univer-
sities is expected to increase university enrolment if it implies a reduction of the monetary
cost of education (￿0 < 0): Changes in drop out instead re￿ ect two opposite forces. On one
hand, the increased supply should reduce the probability to quit university as continuing
academic studies become less costly (￿1 < 0). Thus, the extensive margin increases. On the
other, the policy increases the participation into university of marginal types, who are more
inclined to abandon studies. In this case, the intensive margin decreases.14 In fact, ￿(￿e￿)
is a monotonic decreasing function of Zj as a higher university supply lowers the thresholds







is negative. Which of the two e⁄ects prevails in equilibrium depends
on the magnitude of the two forces and a⁄ects the direction of the change in the number of
taken exams. If drop out increases because the composition e⁄ect exceeds the cost reduction
induced by the policy, the number of exams is expected to increase, otherwise to decrease.
Rewriting the bivariate sample selection model, denote with Y 0 the participation equation














ijt if Y ￿1
ijt > 0 and Y ￿0
ijt > 0
0 otherwise




























where equation (17) is used to estimate enrolment, whilst equation (18), which includes
a non-linear term that accounts for self selection in the previous stage, is implemented to
estimate drop out and exams. In particular, ￿0 is the equivalent of ￿0 in equation 13, ￿1 is
the equivalent of ￿1 in equation 14 and ￿
1 of ￿1 and p1 in equation 15.
More speci￿cally, Yijt is a variable indicating the outcome of interest for the individual
i, resident in province j at the end of secondary school in period t; aj is the province of
secondary school ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t a cohort of graduation ￿xed e⁄ect, Pj is a dummy variable
equal to one for provinces where a new campus has been instituted, and zero otherwise. Pj
is a potentially endogenous variable, whose identi￿cation is described in Section 4.2. Tit is a
"treatment dummy" which takes value of one for treated individuals and zero otherwise; the
coe¢ cient ￿ measures the e⁄ect of the treatment on the treated. Xi is a vector of individual
variables related to family background and past schooling career. Rjt is a vector of provincial
speci￿c time varying controls. ￿(￿d￿;e￿) is the correction term for self selection into enrolment
14Carneiro and Lee (2009) formalize this concept and estimate it on US data.
9or drop out. Finally, "ijt is a zero-mean stochastic error term, clustered at the province and
cohort of graduates￿level to account for correlation of errors within province and time.
The system of equation is jointly estimated using a non-recursive system of maximum
likelihood when both selection in higher education and potential endogeneity of Pj; that
enters the selection and the outcome equation, are accounted for.
Educational choices might be rationalized also with a theory of signaling. The model is
derived under the uncertainty framework as the lack of information on graduate students￿
labor market outcomes would make di¢ cult to test a general equilibrium theory of signaling.
The human capital and signaling model have the same predictions in terms of enrolment
and drop out choices and a di⁄erent one on performance. Under a human capital model,
new universities lower the cost of attending higher education and thereby increase enrolment
and reduce drop out. The lower skill pool of enrolled should imply lower average academic
performance. Under a signaling model, higher intake in university of less marginally talented
individuals reduces the skill pool of drop out. The most able individuals among drop out
have thereby incentives to achieve graduation in order to continue distinguishing themselves
from the less productive. This implies lower drop out rates and higher performance under a
signaling story (see Bedard, 2001). The e⁄ect of the policy on drop out rate does not allow




During the 1990￿ s the Italian higher educational system featured a striking expansion of its
supply. This expansion was driven by two broad rationales: ￿rst, the necessity to spread the
accessibility to university homogeneously across the territory in order to increase equality
of opportunities in human capital investments; second, the need to decongest universities￿
size when that size exceeded forty thousands students enrolled. The objectives triggered
the birth of a number of smaller campuses. The law that regulated the process of expan-
sion commanded that any variation in the existing university supply should be included in
a development plan, to be approved by the Minister of Education every three years. Be-
cause of delays on resources assignment, some campuses, whose institution was forecasted
at the beginning of the 1990￿ s, were e⁄ectively established at the end of the decade. Over
the period 1995-1998, which I focus on, the number of public campuses in Italy increased
from 69 to 81. Figure 1 depicts the territorial distribution of the expansion.15There was an
expansion in twelve provinces throughout the institution of a new campus (Aosta, Vercelli,
Milano, Bolzano, Reggio Emilia, Ravenna, Forli￿ , Ascoli Piceno, Isernia, Caserta, Taranto,
Siracusa), while the number of campuses in the province of Napoli was even reduced be-
cause of the closure of the second University, which opened a subsidiary campus nearby.
The remaining eighty-two provinces maintained the same number of universities. I de￿ne as
"treated provinces" those where the number of campuses changed over the period 1995-98,
15In this process of expansion also private universities were founded. However, changes in the supply of
private universities ruled by private enterprises are left out of consideration because procedures di⁄erent from
those applied for public universities were applied and because other dimensions, as family wealth, a⁄ect the
choice of entering private universities.
10while remaining ones are the control provinces.
I use data collected from the "Survey on School and Work Experiences of Secondary
School Graduates" a cross-section of a representative sample of secondary school graduates
interviewed three years after graduation. The data contain a wide range of information on the
school curriculum and on the post-school experiences, either in college or in the labor market.
Moreover, information on personal characteristics, family background, province of residence
during secondary school, region of university attendance and year of enrolment is available.
The Italian school system of secondary education is mainly structured into tracks that are
either college oriented (high schools) or labor market oriented (technical and vocational
schools). A minor share, between 7 and 8 percent, is composed of schools intended for
individuals aiming at artistic professions. Given the speci￿city of this minor track, students
coming from these secondary schools are excluded from the estimation sample.16
The estimation sample includes 37.053 observations, 17.325 of which belong to the 1995
cohort and the rest to the 1998 one. Some relevant variables in the data su⁄er from non-
response (the number of exams, the score at exit of secondary school, paternal and maternal
education). To avoid dropping observation, missing data are imputed using the multiple
imputation method.
The 1998 and 2001 repeated cross sections of individual data are pooled and information
matched with provincial-level data on the supply of the higher education supply, both in
1995 and 1998 (years in which secondary school graduates were interviewed). Information
about the provincial supply of higher education, including campuses, faculties and degrees
courses, is taken from the annual ISTAT report "Statistics of Higher Education".
Table 1 shows baseline summary statistics for treatment and control groups in terms of
individual level data before the policy implementation to assess whether the program creates
comparable groups. In Table 1, the ￿rst column shows summary statistics of individuals￿
resident at the end of secondary schools in provinces that kept locations￿supply unchanged,
while the second column shows those of individuals living in provinces where campuses￿
provision has changed. The third column presents average di⁄erences between treatment
and control groups with standard errors in parenthesis. There are no statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erences between individual observable characteristics of treatment and comparison group,
except for the fraction of students whose fathers obtained secondary and primary education,
slightly lower in control provinces the ￿rst, higher the latter.
Slightly more than half of respondents are female; average respondent￿ s age is about 22.8;
roughly two thirds are composed of children whose parents have primary education, one third
of children whose parents obtained a secondary school diploma and less than 10 percent have
college graduated parents. Marks at the end of lower secondary school are almost equally
distributed among all respondents, with a prevalence of individuals who obtained a low D
mark. Almost 30 percent of students attained the diploma in a high school, 54 percent in a
technical secondary school and 15 percent in a vocational one. College enrolment is slightly
higher among comparison individuals, whilst the number of exams is slightly lower. The
fact that most of observable individual characteristics are similar across the treatment and
comparison group provides evidence that the policy was somewhat randomized.
16As a robustness check I have also estimated the model including this sub sample of students. Results
are very similar to those reported.
11Figure 1: Changes in university supply between 1995-1998
Performance outcomes are observed in the data only up to the third year of college.
This might a⁄ect the external validity of the analysis as Italian students take on average
seven years to complete their degree instead of four. Looking at Census data, 25 percent of
students drop out before entering the second year, 10 percent do not enter third year and
only 5 percent do not enter the fourth year; thereby, considering drop out up to the third
year should not substantially a⁄ect the external validity of the results.17 As concerns the
number of passed exams, descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that students pass on average
3 exams per year, half the number observed in case their course work would be completed on
time, implying twice the time needed to obtain the degree. This value slightly overestimates
the number of exams that would assess performance beyond the third year of college, without
thereby undermining external validity of the estimates. The next section discusses in detail
the assumptions of the identi￿cation strategy.
4.2 Identi￿cation strategy
An individual￿ s exposure to the program is jointly determined by his year of graduation from
secondary school and his province of secondary school attendance. The young people who
left secondary school in 1995 did not bene￿t from the program, since the higher education
expansion only came into force between 1996 and 1998, whilst individuals who terminated






Female 0,52 0,52 0,00
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Age 22,80 22,94 - 0,14
(0,03) (0,08) (0,09)
Father with college degree 0,10 0,11 - 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Mother with college degree 0,08 0,08 0,00
(0,02) (0,07) (0,01)
Father with secondary degree 0,30 0,32 - 0,02
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Mother with secondary degree 0,27 0,28 - 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Father with primary education or lower 0,59 0,57 0,02
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Mother with primary education or lower 0,65 0,64 0,01
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Junior school mark A 0,22 0,22 0,00
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Junior school mark B 0,20 0,21 - 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Junior school mark C 0,26 0,26 0,00
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Junior school mark D 0,31 0,30 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
High school 0,30 0,30 0,00
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
Technical secondary school 0,55 0,54 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Professional secondary school 0,15 0,16 - 0,01
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
College enrolment 0,52 0,51 0,01
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
College drop out 0,16 0,16 0,00
(0,00) (0,01) (0,01)
Number of exams 8,62 9,01 - 0,49
(0,08) (0,34) (0,35)
Observations 14,613 2,326
Note: Observations are weighted
Table 1: Baseline descriptive statistics (1995 survey) - Individual level data (N=16,535)
13secondary school in 1998 were fully exposed.
Delayed university enrolment could lead to mistakenly consider as non-treated students
that took advantage from the program; in that case, estimates would su⁄er a downward
bias. Similarly, an erroneous value of the program intensity could be assigned to those who
graduated in 1998 and delayed enrolment, since higher education expansion had continued
after 1998. In that case, the e⁄ect of the policy would be overestimated. To avoid these
problems, I drop from the pooled sample individuals who entered higher education in di⁄erent
years from 1995 and 1998.
A second source of variation arises from the expansion of higher education supply across
provinces. Evaluating the enrolment decision and the academic performance according to
the supply of higher education in the province of secondary school could downward bias the
coe¢ cient estimate of the policy because migration introduces measurement errors. On the
contrary, assessing enrolment and performance according to the supply of higher education in
the province where university was attended could give positively biased estimates because of
endogenous selection. To rule out bias induced by endogenous migration, educational choices
are evaluated on the basis of the exogenous supply of higher education in the province of
secondary school.
Identi￿cation of the parameters of interest relies on the di⁄erential intensity of the pro-
gram expansion across provinces and di⁄erences in exposure across cohorts of graduates
induced by the timing of the expansion.
The basic idea behind the identi￿cation strategy can be illustrated using a simple two-
by-two table. Table 2 shows di⁄erences of outcomes￿means, computed at the provincial
level, between 1995 and 1998 by control and treatment groups and provides an empirical
counterpart of equations 13-15.18 It presents the main experiment providing an illustration
of the identi￿cation strategy. A list of outcomes of individuals who had no exposure to the
program is compared to those of individuals who were exposed to the program. Outcomes
of interest are the following: enrolment, a dummy equal one when the individual entered
higher education and zero otherwise; drop out, a dummy that takes value of one whenever
the individual quit university;19 ￿nally, the average number of exams taken during the ￿rst
three years of academic studies as an indicator of individual performance.20
The ￿rst block in Table 2 presents the change in enrolment over the period for the
two groups of provinces. In both groups the average enrolment dropped over the years.
However, it decreased less in provinces that set up more universities. Considering changes
in withdrawal behavior for the population of students that entered higher education, it
emerges that drop out diminished in all provinces, but more in treated ones. The number of
exams declined in both groups of provinces, but more where new universities were opened.
The simple di⁄erences in Table 2 suggest that higher education expansion led to increase
enrolment across Italian provinces, decrease drop out and, interestingly, caused a reduction in
the number of exams. However, none of these di⁄erences is statistically signi￿cant. Changes
18Students resident in the Napoli province in 1998 are in the control group for this descriptive analysis.
19Students who drop out leave the higher educational system. Thus, students who enrol in a di⁄erent
university to complete the same or a di⁄erent degree are considered as enrolled.
20Unfortunately, information on grades scored at university is not available. However, this is a minor
problem as in Italy universities strategically adjust grading standards to a⁄ect enrolment (see Bagues et al.,
2006).
14Figure 2: Time series of the provincial unemployment rate by control and treated provinces
in individual characteristics, background variables and labor market conditions between 1995
and 1998 could o⁄set the e⁄ect of the policy on the outcomes of interest. In the regression
analysis, by controlling for these other sources of variations, the e⁄ect of the expansion can
be assessed more precisely.
The di⁄erence in di⁄erences between treated and control groups can be interpreted as the
causal e⁄ect of the policy, under the assumption that in the absence of the higher education
expansion, the trend of the variables of interest would have not been systematically di⁄erent
between control and treated provinces. To provide evidence in favour of this hypothesis,
Figure 2 shows the trend of the unemployment rate by treated and control provinces before
the policy was implemented.21 Even if not exactly parallel, the two lines appear very similar
and slightly diverge only after the expansion of higher education, supporting the parallel
trend hypothesis.
To rely on this identi￿cation strategy and infer a causal e⁄ect of the program on university
enrolment, drop out and performance, some comments are worth mentioning. As Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1988a) discuss, one should not downplay the possibility of a compensatory
intervention, meaning a universities allocation rule that geographically distributes expansion
in such a way to provide less endowed areas with higher public investments. If this were the
case, the e⁄ect of the program would be overestimated. As discussed above, the allocation
of funds to higher education investments was driven by two broad economic rationales: the
necessity of rebalancing universities premises nationwide and that of splitting overcrowding
21ISTAT provides labour market statistics at the provincial level only since 1993. Moreover, until 1995,




Cohort 1998 0,365 0,327 0,038
(0,024) (0,009) (0,025)
Cohort 1995 0,475 0,476 0,001
(0,036) (0,012) (0,038)
Di⁄erence -0,111 -0,148 0,039
(0,044) (0,148) (0,046)
Drop out
Cohort 1998 0,113 0,158 -0,045
(0,018) (0,007) (0,020)
Cohort in 1995 0,157 0,180 -0,023
(0,018) (0,008) (0,020)
Di⁄erence -0,044 -0,022 -0,022
(0,012) (0,011) (0,017)
Number of exams
Cohort 1998 9,084 8,516 0,568
(0,399) (0,114) (0,415)
Cohort 1995 9,361 8,747 0,614
(0,334) (0,163) (0,371)
Di⁄erence -0,277 -0,231 -0,046
(0,387) (0,414) (0,412)
Note: Means and standard errors in brackets
Table 2: Means of outcomes of interest by cohort of graduation and treatment
16universities. The ￿rst criterion is a form of a compensatory policy intervention; the second
one goes in the opposite direction since overcrowded universities were principally located in
areas that were already well endowed. However, a standard way to circumvent the possibility
that some pre treatment observable characteristics a⁄ected the policy rule is to condition
the outcome equations on provincial ￿xed e⁄ects (as proposed by Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1988a). This method is appropriate if the outcomes of interest are not systematically di⁄erent
between treated and control provinces.
Another related but distinct issue regards the possibility that the policy was endogenous
(Besley and Case, 2000). The allocation rule of new universities premises was not explicit. It
might be the case that investments in higher education infrastructures re￿ ected some politi-
cal, demographic and economic variables, which were time-variant provincial speci￿c. If these
variables were also correlated with educational outcomes and are omitted from the outcome
equation, the estimated e⁄ect of the policy would result biased. Although the allocation
rule was not explicitly de￿ned, the law, which established procedures for the opening of a
new campus at the beginning of the 1990￿ s, clearly stated its objectives. These were "...To
ensure a balanced development and adjustment of higher education provision keeping into
account local potential demand, big metropolitan areas, gaps between the North and South
and national instructive needs."22 I check whether the actual allocation rule decided upon by
the universities and the Ministry of Education achieved the planned objectives. The log of
secondary school graduates in 1992 at provincial level is used as a proxy for potential demand
at the beginning of the 1990￿ s.23 Metropolitan area is controlled for with a dummy equal to
one when the province was located in a region endowed with an overcrowded university and
zero otherwise. Territorial disparities are controlled for by the log of the professors-students
ratio computed at regional level.24 The ￿rst column of Table 3 presents results from a probit
of the policy dummy on the just described variables. Coe¢ cients have the expected sign:
potential demand and being located in a region endowed with an overcrowded university
positively a⁄ect campuses￿institution, whilst a proportionate teaching sta⁄ is negatively
correlated with the expansion. This exercise shows that the policy could be endogenous as
it might depend on variables that a⁄ect both the demand and the supply side of education,
even though these variables are not signi￿cant and explain only four percent of provincial
variation. In fact, politicians in the 1990￿ s might have measured these factors di⁄erently.
The assessment made by the Ministry of Education "...With respect to the development and
rebalancing of university premises prevailed - at least for the most part - a non selective "all
over the place" approach, inspired by a barely incremental purpose..." con￿rms the absence
of explicit and clear criteria.25
To address the fact that the policy could be endogenous, an IV strategy is implemented.
The instruments are two political variables: the ￿rst is a dummy taking value of one if at the
beginning of the 1990￿ s, when the law was enacted, the province was ruled by the same party
that had the majority at the national Parliament over the same time period (the Christian
Democrat Party, DC thereafter). The second variable is the interaction between this dummy
22Law 245/1990, art. 1 (a), my translation.
23Source: ISTAT. Data on secondary school leavers were not collected at regional level before 1992.
24Source: MIUR (1997) "Enclosure E - Veri￿cation universities￿development plans 1986-1990 and 1991-
1993". The information is available only at the regional level.
25MIUR (1997) "Veri￿cation of universities￿development plan 1986-90 and 1991-93", doc. 4/97, pg.10.
17and the fraction of provincial political positions (councilors) held by members of the DC￿ s
party. Political variables are expected to a⁄ect the allocation of public funds at the local level,
whilst they should not in￿ uence individuals￿educational choices. Control for the presence
of a DC government at the regional level is included as well. The second column in Table 3
shows that being a province ruled by the DC￿ s party positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the
probability of increasing the supply of higher education, but at a rate decreasing with the
concentration of power in DC￿ s politicians. These signs are coherent with the idea that public
expenditures were assigned to pivotal provinces in order to acquire their political consensus
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Dixit and Londregan, 1995 and Brollo and Nannicini, 2010).
The presence of a DC government at the regional level has a negative e⁄ect on the change in
the supply of universities￿campuses, but not signi￿cant. Provincial governments attracted
resources beyond the power of regional administration because the procedure established for
the institution of a new university campus required universities￿proposal to be approved by
central government and not by regional ones. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients and their
level of signi￿cance show that, as previously argued, political motives were more relevant than
economic rationales in determining funds￿allocation, providing support for the experimental
setting of the policy.
A few further points are worth mentioning. First, local labor market characteristics, such
as a high unemployment rate, might have in￿ uenced the policy rule. As a compensatory
intervention, the government might have wanted to bring more resources to more depressed
economic areas. Since labor market conditions a⁄ect the opportunity cost of schooling, it
could also have played a role in shaping the demand for higher education. Second, students￿
educational outcomes, according to their province of origin, might have a⁄ected the policy
rule if the selection of provinces where locating a new campus was determined by poor
educational indicators at the provincial level. Finally, provincial economic performance might
have implied both higher ￿scal resources to institute a new campus and higher demand for
tertiary education. To account for these possibilities, the third column of Table 3 presents the
speci￿cation that includes the level of provincial unemployment rate in 1990, the fraction
of the provincial population with a degree in 1991 and the growth rate of the provincial
employment rate between 1981 and 1991. The signs of the coe¢ cient of interest are coherent
with the economic interpretation given above. In particular, the employment growth rate
has a positive but not signi￿cant e⁄ect on change in campuses local supply, whilst the
unemployment rate and the fraction of graduates have a negative and not signi￿cant e⁄ect.
The inclusion of these controls does not undermine the identi￿cation strategy. In fact,
political variables have lower coe¢ cients but still signi￿cant at 5 and 10 percent level. To
check for the validity of the identi￿cation strategy, the outcomes of interest are estimated
instrumenting the policy with the set of provincial controls just described.
The quasi experimental research design could be invalidated in presence of lack of com-
pliance at the province level. This may occur if after assignment, some provinces assigned to
treatment did not institute the university or all the faculties forecasted. The realization of
the development plans that included changes in the provision of universities￿supply occurred
after 1990, when funds were assigned. A speci￿c commission was deputed to report on the
realization of the development plans to the Ministry of Education. Their documents show
that the actual plan realized in 1998 coincides with the content of the development plans,
18ruling out lack of compliance at the province level.26
The theoretical speci￿cation shows that individuals are non-randomly sorted into drop
out and that the distribution could be truncated from below given previous self selection
into enrolment, thus calling for the Heckman selection model. To identify the parameters of
interest without excessive reliance on functional forms, it is necessary to instrument selection
in enrolment with variables that a⁄ect the choice of entering university without directly
in￿ uencing the individual decision to drop out. Instruments usually used in the literature
are: indicators of higher education local supply, capturing the fact that students grown
up in an area without a college or their preferred degree face higher costs of education;
local unemployment rate, measuring the opportunity cost of the educational investment;
and the number of siblings, a proxy of the resources available per capita given household
characteristics (Card, 1995, Cappellari, 2004, Cinzano and Cipollone, 2007 and Di Pietro and
Cutillo, 2008). These sources of variation implicitly assume that the e⁄ects of the direct costs
of the investment are anticipated and included in the decision process when the enrolment
choice is made. Therefore, drop out decision is determined by individual shocks (as an update
of their ability to pursue academic studies) that are unrelated to the local supply of higher
education, the opportunity cost of education at the time the enrolled decision occurred and
family size.
In this framework, the presence of a nearby university is the relevant explanatory variable
in both the selection and the outcome equation and cannot indeed be used as a suitable
instrument. However, the number of academic courses at the local level can be used as a proxy
re￿ ecting the variety of academic alternatives provided to potential students. The higher
is the number of locally supplied courses the higher is the probability that an individual
￿nds a course tailored to his abilities and interests. In turn, courses variability at the time
the enrolment decision was made is not expected to a⁄ect drop out choices. Similarly,
the provincial unemployment level at the time the enrolment decision occurred is expected
to a⁄ect the opportunity cost of attending university but not the drop out decision later,
conditional on the unemployment rate at the time the drop out decision occurs. Finally,
number of siblings and mother housewife are a proxy for family permanent income and
not transitory income shocks that could induce drop out. These four variables are used as
instruments in the selection equation.
The last point concerns the set of time varying provincial controls to be included, the
variation of the provincial unemployment rate and of the number of students who successfully
terminated secondary school between 1995 and 1998. The ￿rst variable controls for possible
changes in labor market opportunities that might be correlated with educational choices,
whilst the second for variations of the potential demand for higher education. Finally,
estimates rely on the identi￿cation assumption that there is no omitted time-varying and
province speci￿c e⁄ect that might be correlated with the program. This assumption will be
violated if the allocation of other programs was correlated with the establishment of new
campuses. Along with the new campuses￿set up, the Legislator spurred the expansion of
existing universities by allowing the institution of new Faculties and/or new degrees courses.
Identi￿cation is achieved by controlling for this second source of expansion, probably a
26These documents can be downloaded at http://www.vsu.it/ website, under the "Publications and Doc-
uments" section.
19substitute for the one under analysis.27
Allocation of new sites
New sites New sites New sites
Log of sec. school leavers, 1992 0,006 -0,031 0,013
[0,061] [0,043] [0,048]
Overcrowded university in the region 0,001 0,029 -0,001
[0,091] [0,079] [0,087]
Log of prof. for 100 students, 1990 -0,154 -0,116 -0,081
[0,113] [0,114] [0,121]
DC at provincial government 0,722 0,544
[0,331]** [0,294]*
DC at provincial government*DC positions -0,014 -0,011
[0,006]** [0,005]**
DC at regional government -0,011 -0,003
[0,099] [0,091]
Provincial population with degree, 1991 -0,038
[0,032]
Provincial unemployment rate, 1990 -0,002
[0,003]
Growth rate provincial occupation, 1981-1991 0,855
[0,699]
Observations 95 95 95
Pseudo R-squared 0,04 0,09 0,12
Note: Probit model. Marginal e⁄ects evaluated at 1 reported. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the regional level in brackets.* signi￿cant at 10 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5
percent; *** signi￿cant at 1 percent.
Table 3: The allocation of sites
5 Results
5.1 College enrolment
The ￿rst set of results is presented in Table 4 that shows linear probability estimates of
the e⁄ect of the higher education expansion on college enrolment. The dependent variable
Yijt takes value of one if the individual is enrolled and zero otherwise. Following Du￿ o
(2001) and Bratti et al. (2007), the new campus dummy is normalized to account for
27Other possible simultaneous policy interventions occurred at the end of the Nineties were the reform of
the secondary school exit exam (Law n.425/1997) and the law that regulated admissions in faculties with
numerus clausus (Law n. 264/1999). The ￿rst was implemented in 1999 for the ￿rst cohort of secondary
school graduates, after the period during which the expansion of higher education under analysis took
place. The second one, following the urging from the Constitutional Court, disciplined at the national level
admission restrictions, previously regulated at the university level. Before the law was enacted, students
who appealed against admission restriction because not admitted to degrees with numerus clausus, were
reintegrated in their chosen degree. Even if some faculties introduced restrictions on admission between 1995
and 1998, the chance to appeal and being reintegrated exclude correlation with the policy under analysis.
20heterogenous cohort size at provincial level, by dividing it for the number of individuals who
get a secondary degree in that province in 1998 (in thousands). The baseline speci￿cation
in column 1 includes controls for province ￿xed e⁄ects, cohort of graduates dummy and
normalized program variable interacted with the treatment dummy.
The e⁄ect of the higher education expansion turns out to be positive, but not statistically
signi￿cant as shown by the descriptive statistics in Table 2. The coe¢ cient decreases slightly,
but acquires signi￿cance after the inclusion of individual speci￿c controls and time-varying
provincial controls, suggesting that the e⁄ect of the policy is o⁄set by changes over time of
individuals and local characteristics. The estimated coe¢ cient in the speci￿cation with the
full set of controls indicates that the likelihood of entering university increases by 8 percent
for each new campus per 1,000 secondary school graduates created at the provincial level.
The e⁄ect of the policy is slightly lower than the e⁄ect of the ￿ Bologna process￿estimated
by Cappellari and Lucifora (2010), who found a 9 percent increase in enrolment due to the
reform. Relative to average enrolment as displayed in Table 1, mean enrolment increases by
15 percent for each new university instituted every 1,000 secondary school graduates. To
assess the validity of the identi￿cation strategy the treatment variable is instrumented with
the set of provincial political variables described in Section 4.2. The coe¢ cient of the policy
corrected for endogeneity is slightly higher than the OLS estimates, indicating that the new
campuses were instituted in provinces where enrolment would have been lower absent the
policy. However, the estimated coe¢ cient is not signi￿cant. Moreover, the overidenti￿cation
test does not reject the hypothesis of orthogonal excluded instruments and the Hausman test
does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the treatment variable, indicating that
the coe¢ cient in the OLS speci￿cation is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the one obtained
by instrumenting the policy. This test suggests that, as argued in Section 4.2, the allocation
rule was almost random.
Having established that the reform increases signi￿cantly enrolment rates, it is important
to assess whether this expansion attracts students hailing from less a› uent backgrounds. The
identi￿cation framework outlined above can be generalized to an interaction term analysis to
assess the speci￿c e⁄ect of higher education expansion by family background and individual
ability. Ability is measured by the mark at the end of junior school, broadly de￿ned in
four classes: A, B, C, D.28 Subsequent columns of the Table show the interactions between
the reform and personal characteristics. The speci￿cation chosen is the third one, which
includes the whole set of provincial time varying controls. Results show that the expansion
mainly bene￿ts middle ability individuals whose parents have secondary education: there is
a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the program on enrolment of students awarded with a C
mark at the exit of lower secondary school; students whose fathers have secondary education
increase their probability to enter higher education by on average 4 percent. These results
show that the program, lowering the psychological cost of the investment, has improved
educational opportunities.
28This variable is chosen as a proxy for individual ability instead of the mark at the end of upper secondary
school because standards of the latter su⁄er high variability among di⁄erent types of secondary school (a
given mark in a vocational school does not convey the same information as the same mark in a high school),

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































225.2 College drop out
Results discussed in Section 5.1 indicate that part of the e⁄ect of the expansion works through
a reduction of the impact of parental background on the choice of entering university. This
result would imply an increase in intergenerational mobility only if this additional in￿ ow of
students is not more largely inclined to drop out university. Otherwise, changes at entry
would not translate into equivalent changes at university exit, without reducing the role of
family background on human capital investment.
The e⁄ect of the expansion on withdrawal can be directly assessed because in the survey
respondents were asked whether or not they began and then interrupted academic studies.
Since the question is answered three years after enrolment and since the majority of students
generally quit university within the ￿rst three years, this variable is a good measure for drop
out changes.
The theoretical speci￿cation suggests that learning over individual ability endogenously
leads students to drop out if the signal acquired during university attendance reveals low
talent. Also, the model shows that individuals are non-randomly sorted into drop out given
previous self selection into enrolment. To identify the parameters of interest I use the four
instruments described in Section 4.2: the number of available degree and the unemployment
rate at the provincial level at the time when the enrolment decision is made, the number of
siblings and a dummy for mother housewife.
As the institution of a new university is suggested to in￿ uence both the selection equation
and the outcome, it is included as a regressor in the two stages of the model. The inter-
pretation of the marginal e⁄ect for this variable must consequently be adjusted to correct

























where ￿ is the e⁄ect of Pj in the selection equation and ￿u the standard deviation of
the residual in the selection equation.29
Table 5 presents results from the Heckman two stages equation of a drop out indicator
given self selection into higher education. Coe¢ cients are reported according to the above
correction showing ￿ and ￿￿. In all speci￿cations, supply expansion turns out to both nega-
tively and signi￿cantly a⁄ect drop out decision. The average e⁄ect, statistically signi￿cant,
is in order of -6 percent for each new campus per 1,000 secondary school graduates instituted
and it is stable across all speci￿cations. In all speci￿cation the composition term is positive
and signi￿cant, indicating that the probability of abandoning academic studies increases as
an e⁄ect of the change in the composition of students enrolled. However, the magnitude of
this e⁄ect is very small (0,002-0,003 percent). The sum of the two coe¢ cients shows that
the prevailing e⁄ect of the higher education expansion is the cost reduction associated with
university continuation, indicating that the composition e⁄ect is small with respect to the
monetary cost reduction one. Relative to mean statistics displayed in Table 1, the policy
implied a reduction in drop out rate of 37,5 percent relative to mean drop out. On the
contrary, the ￿ Bologna process￿increased drop out rate by 8 percent.
29Standard errors for the corrected marginal e⁄ects are computed using the Delta method.
23Considering the selectivity issue, it emerges that all instrumental variables are signi￿cant
in a⁄ecting the enrolment choices and that the null hypothesis of independent equations is
always rejected. The last two columns report the estimates of the Heckman model corrected
for potential endogeneity of the treatment variable, both at the outcome and at the selection
equation. The coe¢ cient ￿ is higher than in previous speci￿cation, but it is not statisti-
cally signi￿cant. As the conditional mixed process estimator implemented to estimate the
system of equations does not allow to test endogeneity and overidenti￿cation hypothesis, I
constructed the Hausman test statistics, that has a ￿ value of 0,079, whose p value is between
0;750￿ 0;900. The test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogenous regressor.
The interaction term analysis (Table 6) shows that drop out reduction occurs especially
among students marked C at junior school, who reduce by 6,6 percent their probability
of quitting university. The interactions with parental education do not show a particular
e⁄ect. The presented evidence proves that the additional intakes into university due to the
expansion has not experienced higher drop out, being consistent with the idea that the policy














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Junior school mark A* Treat*(1+beta) -0,011
[0,018]
Junior school mark B* Treat*(1+beta) 0,015
[0,028]
Junior school mark C* Treat*(1+beta) -0,066
[0,022]**
Junior school mark D* Treat*(1+beta) -0,031
[0,038]
Father college degree*Treat*(1+beta) 0,014
[0,023]
Father secondary degree*Treat*(1+beta) 0,025
[0,027]
Father lower degree*Treat*(1+beta) -0,032
[0,022]
Controls yes yes
Controls: Rj*Treatment yes yes
Observations 34167 34167
Note: Heckman Selection Model estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets; *
signi￿cant at 10 percent; ** signi￿cant at 5 percent;*** signi￿cant at 1 percent.
Standard errors are clustered at province and cohort level. Observations based
on population weights. Speci￿cation 5 in Table 5.
Table 6: Probability of college drop out, interacted term analysis
5.3 Exams
An interesting e⁄ect of this higher education expansion concerns the impact on individual
academic performance. A major failure of the Italian higher educational system is due to the
extremely long period of time that many students take to graduate from university. Oddly,
this prolonged permanence in university is not explained by a parallel activity in the labour
market during the studies. Rather, the fraction of students employed in the age bracket
20-24 was, in 2001, roughly 3,3 percent in Italy, against an average 10,6 percent displayed
by all the other OECD countries.30
The sequential model suggests that a reduction of the drop out rate implies lower aca-
demic performance. Indeed, changes in the composition of the stock of enrolled due to the
higher intakes and the lower withdrawal should a⁄ect the overall composition of students￿
characteristics in provinces where the expansion occurred. Likely, since new enrolled are
composed of individuals with middle ability, the students￿body should feature a lower aver-
age ability after the policy implementation. This composition e⁄ect should negatively a⁄ect
aggregate provincial performance. The data enable identi￿cation of the number of exams
thanks to a direct survey question.
As for drop out, estimating number of exams requires to account for self selection in the
group of students that continue university. However, as noticed in note 10, the choice of drop
out and the amount of human capital investment are probably made simultaneously and not
in a strict sequential order. In fact, the number of exams given is also observed in the data
30See: Education at a glance, 1999.
26for a group of students who dropped out. To empirically account for this simultaneity, selec-
tion is applied to the enrolment choice using the same identi￿cation assumption described
in section 4.2. Moreover, the theoretical model indicates that the e⁄ect of the policy on the
human capital investment works throughout the non-linear composition term. However, in
the empirical speci￿cation a linear term for the policy is added to capture possible com-
plementary between the non-monetary (e⁄ort related) cost of education and the monetary
one. Thus, the marginal e⁄ect of new universities￿set up is estimated with the correction
presented in equation (19).
The ￿rst set of results is presented in Table 7, which shows coe¢ cient estimates from
the Heckman procedure applied to the number of exams on a set of controls, which include
the type of degree entered. The linear e⁄ect of the policy, almost stable across all speci￿-
cations, indicates that the number of exams decreases by more than one exam because of
the campuses￿expansion, whilst the composition e⁄ect, although very small, is positive. In
the attempt to understand why the expansion exerts a negative e⁄ect on individual perfor-
mance, I add a control for the type of faculty instituted. To this, I de￿ne a dummy equal
to one when more than 50 percent of faculties within the new instituted universities were
scienti￿c.31 The idea is that the set up of a new campus specialized in tougher scienti￿c
subjects might negatively a⁄ect students￿performance. By adding this control (column 7),
the negative e⁄ect of the policy vanishes and is captured by the scienti￿c faculty dummy.
This ￿nding suggests that performance lowers in provinces that institute scienti￿c courses,
which are more di¢ cult to undertake. In particular, students enrolled in scienti￿c subjects
passed 2 exams less as an e⁄ect of the policy, 20 percent less than the average value displayed
in Table 1. One possible reason why the sign of the composition e⁄ect is not coherent with
the discussion done in the theoretical section might rely on the fact that new campuses could
have more incentives to lower standards and facilitate academic students￿progress in order to
attract local demand (see Bargues et al., 2006). Considering the selectivity issue, it emerges
that the hypothesis of independent equations is not rejected when individual and provincial
controls are included. The last two columns report the estimates of the non-recursive system
of maximum likelihood. Coe¢ cients are not substantially di⁄erent from those reported in
the previous two columns; as for drop out, exogenity of the coe¢ cient of interest is tested by
constructing the test statistics, that has ￿ = 0;627, with p value in between 0;250 ￿ 0;500.
Also in this case, the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected.
Looking at the interacted analysis (Table 8), it emerges a signi￿cant reduction in exams
for students marked A at junior school (-0,7) and C (-2,2). Middle ability students reduce
by more than 2 the number of exams taken. Children of parents with tertiary education
pass 1,7 fewer exams. This evidence seems to hold up the idea that the composition e⁄ect
plays a role. Indeed, individuals that slow their progress down are those who in the absence
of the policy would not have entered university or would have dropped out.
Overall, it seems that the policy has gone in the direction of retaining students in the
schooling system, but slowed their performance down, especially with regards to the institu-
tion of new scienti￿c courses, thereby prolonging time passed in education. Another possible
reason why a reduction of the educational progress is observed could rely on a more intensive
31The Italian Ministry of Education classi￿es faculties according to the following ￿eld area: medical,
scienti￿c, humanistic and social. Scienti￿c faculties include Architecture, Engineering and Mathematics.
27activity in the labor market. In fact, shorter travelling distances to university could leave
more time to be allocated on working activities rather than on studies. However, by running
a linear probability model on the likelihood of being a working student, it emerges that new
campuses have no e⁄ects at all on the propensity to carry on academic activities along with
working ones.
Finally, the fact that performance does not increase as an e⁄ect of the policy provides
some evidence against the signaling model and in favor of the human capital theory. However,
a better assessment of which theory applies would require analyzing also the e⁄ect of the
policy on graduation probability and labor market outcomes of secondary school graduates













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Junior school mark A* Treat*(1+beta) -0,734
[0,262]**
Junior school mark B* Treat*(1+beta) -0,193
[0,405]
Junior school mark C* Treat*(1+beta) -2,240
[1,095]*
Junior school mark D* Treat*(1+beta) -0,267
[0,463]
Father college degree*Treat*(1+beta) 0,426
[0,419]
Father secondary degree*Treat*(1+beta) -1,784
[0,455]***
Father lower degree*Treat*(1+beta) -0,357
[0,360]
Controls yes yes
Controls: Rj*Treatment yes yes
Observations 31770 31770
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10 percent; ** signi￿cant at
5 percent; *** signi￿cant at 1 percent. Standard errors are clustered at province and
cohort level. Observations are based on population weights. Speci￿cation 5 in Table 7.
Table 8: Number of exams, interacted term analysis
6 Robustness checks
In this section I perform some checks to assess the robustness of the results to other spec-
i￿cations. The ￿rst is the use of a di⁄erent de￿nition of treatment, which is extended to
provinces located to a less than one hour distance from the treated ones.32
Table 9 presents results for the outcomes of interest, according to the speci￿cation that
includes both individual controls and provincial time varying variables. Enrolment is esti-
mated with a linear probability model, whilst drop out and exams are estimated with the
Heckman selection model. For all the outcomes of interest, coe¢ cients are qualitatively sim-
ilar to those estimated with the smallest set of treated provinces. The impact on enrolment,
drop out and number of exams is lower than the one estimated in the previous section.
The lower signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients of interest is due to the inclusion of individuals
potentially exposed to the treatment in the treatment group.
Another useful test regards the sensitivity of results to the control and treatment group
composition. Since the policy was implemented in regions located in the North and South
of Italy, it could be useful to restrict the analysis to the group of regions sited in the same
macro-area, which might be more likely to satisfy the parallel trend hypothesis. To this end,
32Distances from the treated regions were computed using Google Map. One hour as maximum limit was
chosen because students from nearby provinces might realistically reach the new site one hour away. The
new treatment dummy includes the following provinces among the treated ones: Novara, Asti, Alessandria,




Enrolment Drop out Exams






Controls yes yes yes
Controls: Rj*Treatment yes yes yes
Observations 34167 34167 34167
R-squared 0,42
Note: Linear Probability Model Estimates (LPM) and Heckman Model;
Robust standard errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10 percent;
** signi￿cant at 5 percent;*** signi￿cant at 1 percent. Standard errors
are clustered at provincial and cohort level. Observations are based
on population weights. Each outcome is estimated including the whole
set of individual and provincial controls.
Table 9: Outputs estimated including provinces located less than one hour away from treated
provinces
two groups of regions are considered, Northern and Southern ones.33 Four provinces are
treated among the Northern regions, ￿ve among the Southern ones.
Table 10 shows results from estimating outputs of interest separately for the two sub
samples of the population with the full set of controls, individual and time varying provincial
speci￿c. Enrolment rises in both macro area. The probability of being retained in university
is higher in both macroarea, but signi￿cantly in the North. The composition term displays
coe¢ cient similar between the two groups of regions and with respect to the speci￿cation
including the whole sample. The di⁄erence between the two areas concerns the e⁄ect of the
policy on the number of exams, which does not change substantially in Northern provinces,
whilst it signi￿cantly does in Southern provinces.
The reason why students with the same school curriculum make di⁄erent educational
choices between the two macro areas relies on the fact that the faculties instituted are
di⁄erent. In Southern regions the new campuses opened only scienti￿c faculties (the only
exception was the faculty of Psychology instituted in Caserta), whilst in the North, besides
scienti￿c faculties, new campuses opened also social and humanistic ones. As scienti￿c
courses are relatively tougher than others are, enrolling in such degrees might imply a lower
propensity to being retained in university and a slower academic progress.34
33Northern regions include Piemonte, Val D￿ Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia
Giulia, Liguria. Southern ones take in Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria and Sicilia.
34Mobility might have had an impact, but since all outcomes are evaluated considering the province of
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Controls yes yes yes
Controls: Rj*Treatment yes yes yes
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Controls yes yes yes
Controls: Rj*Treat. yes yes yes
Observations 13975 13975 13975
R-squared 0,42
Note: Linear Probability Model Estimates (LPM) and Heckman Model;
Robust standard errors in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10 percent;
** signi￿cant at 5 percent;*** signi￿cant at 1 percent. Standard errors
are clustered at province and cohort level. Observations are based on
population weights. Each outcome is estimated including the whole
set of individual and provincial controls.
Table 10: Outputs estimated for di⁄erent subgroups of the population
327 Conclusion
In this paper I used pooled data on two cohorts of secondary school graduates to assess the
impact of the campus expansion on a series of indicators related to human capital invest-
ments, exploiting the quasi-natural experiment nature of this policy.
I ￿nd that new campuses increase university enrolment and that the e⁄ect is largely
concentrated among middle ability individuals with less favorable family background. This
new ￿ ow of intakes signi￿cantly increases the probability of being retained in the university
system. This evidence can be interpreted as an e⁄ect of lower psychological costs on the
decision of investing in higher education.
However, local universities do not boost successful academic performance: rather, a
decline in the aggregate number of exams is observed. A partial explanation relies on the
fact that the change in the composition of the students￿body induced by the policy due
to the new ￿ ow of intakes into university and the reduced out￿ ow of drop out lowers the
average ability of the pool of students who enter university. Therefore, the performance of
marginal students declines. However, the estimated e⁄ect of the change in the composition
of students enrolled is shown to be very small. The variation in the performance is rather
explained by the type of degree instituted, whether scienti￿c or not. Indeed, the number of
exams passed declines substantially in Southern provinces that mostly set up new scienti￿c
courses, without displaying substantial changes in provinces where other types of faculties
are instituted.
The paper shows that instituting scienti￿c faculties in less developed area does not always
mitigate disparities in educational attainment. There are a few reasons why this type of pol-
icy partially failed. First, math competencies are already unevenly distributed nationwide at
the lower secondary school: students resident in the South of the country display signi￿cantly
lower levels of achievement (see Bratti et al., 2007). Besides the fact that such di⁄erences
should be ￿lled in previous stages of the educational process, this evidence suggests that in-
vesting in scienti￿c higher education does not represent an e¢ cient way to tackle disparities.
Furthermore, new scienti￿c faculties located in depressed areas would not lead development
absent a complementary policy direct to create job opportunities for the scienti￿c skilled
labor force.
This university policy, which encouraged local institutions, on one side has increased
equality of opportunities nationwide by opening access to more groups in the society and
reducing the impact of family background on the decision to enter higher education. But on
the other hand, it has gone in the direction of strengthening regional disparities, given wide
negative e⁄ects on individual performance in less developed regions.
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